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In-space assembly (ISA), the ability to build structures in space, has the potential to 
enable or support a wide range of advanced mission capabilities. Many different individual 
assembly technologies would be needed in different combinations to serve many mission 
concepts. The many-to-many relationship between mission needs and technologies makes it 
difficult to determine exactly which specific technologies should receive priority for 
development and demonstration. Furthermore, because enabling technologies are still 
immature, no realistic, near-term design reference mission has been described that would 
form the basis for flowing down requirements for such development and demonstration. 
This broad applicability without a single, well-articulated mission makes it difficult to 
advance the technology all the way to flight readiness. This paper reports on a study that 
prioritized individual technologies across a broad field of possible missions to determine 
priority for future technology investment. 
Nomenclature 
COTS = Commerical, off-the-shelf 
ISA = In Space Assembly 
ISS = International Space Station 
QFD = Quality Function Deployment 
TRL = Technology Readiness Level 
I. Introduction 
he International Space Station (ISS) demonstrated that assembling structures in space can vastly expand the 
capabilities of space systems when compared with the single-launch paradigm used in the Apollo program. 
ISS’s approach to in-space assembly involved docking or berthing complex, pre-integrated modules together at 
standard, nodal interfaces, supplemented by hands-on astronaut labor performing intra- and extra-vehicular activity 
and directly operating robotic arms. 
Next-generation in-space assembly could more closely resemble construction, bringing together simpler, more 
primitive elements to form contiguous structures that are too large to be launched as single modules packaged into 
launch shrouds. Structues would be assembled primarily with robots being operated from Earth.  Technology for this 
advanced, in-space assembly (ISA) of large, structural modules has been built upon earlier development work and 
flight experiments going back to the 1980s1. 
Too often, a new aerospace technology falls into the notorious mid-Technology Readiness Level (TRL) “valley 
of death” between the time it demonstrates its feasibility and when it has validated its flight readiness by 
performance in a relevant environment as part of an integrated system. The modest levels of technology-push 
funding that got it to the functional breadboard stage cannot support the more expensive, extensive testing needed to 
cross that gap. If the technology can prove its advantages for a high-interest mission, then more generous mission 
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funds with well-defined system and environmental requirements can pull it across the valley of death. However, 
broadly applicable technologies like those needed to enable the next generation of in-space assembled space systems 
have a difficult time attracting this kind of mission-pull funding.  
The technology base for in-space assembly involves dozens of component technologies at various levels of 
technology readiness. Many future systems, especially future large space telescopes that are still conceptual, will 
require this technology to enable the next leaps in mission performance, and many others NASA missions could 
greatly benefit from it. Yet for all its potential, no single mission can justify the investment needed to pull the 
required technologies across the mid-TRL gap for the benefit of all. 
 Organizations that have a mandate to advance these generically-useful technologies, like NASA’s Space 
Technology Mission Directorate, seek to know which technology investments are likely to have the highest leverage 
in supporting future mission capabilities. To answer this question, technology managers at NASA Langley Research 
Center conducted a study to sort the full set of in-space assembly technologies against the widest spectrum of NASA 
missions in order to inform investment priorities. 
II. Methodology 
The methodology selected for this study was the Quality Function Deployment (QFD)2. QFD is a standard 
industrial methodology credited with being key to the quality improvements in the Japanese auto industry in the 
1980s. The portion of the QFD method used in this study compares the value of multiple approaches to achieving 
multiple objectives with consideration for when those approaches are conflicting, synergistic, or non-interacting. 
Both the approaches and the objectives can themselves be weighted by intrinsic 
factors, and the weights propagated into the overall assessment. 
In the QFD parlance, the desired objectives are called the “WHATs”. The 
approaches to achieving those objectives are called the “HOWs”. The center of the 
QFD analysis is a matrix that deploys the WHATs, listed along the vertical axis, 
against the HOWs, listed along the horizontal. The compatibility of the various 
HOWs are assessed in a triangular half-matrix above the list. The relevance of 
each WHAT and HOW is noted in the body of the matrix. The resultant figure has a 
characteristic house-like shape and is called “the House of Quality” (Figure 1). 
This study did not consider the compatibility of the various HOWs in the “roof” of 
the House of Quality. 
The quantitative score for comparing approaches (HOWs) is generated 
arithmetically by the following generic procedure, which was implemented in 
this study in an Excel spreadsheet: 
1. A weight reflecting the value of an intrinsic quality is assigned to each 
WHAT and each HOW as appropriate. If multiple intrinsic factors are 
considered appropriate, they are combined multiplicatively into a single 
score. 
2. An assessment of the relevance of each WHAT to each HOW is made and quantified. 
3. The score for each WHAT-HOW pair is the WHAT’s weight times its quantified relevance to the particular HOW. 
This is registered in the matrix in the WHAT’s row of the HOW’s column.  
4. The score for each HOW is the sum of all the WHAT-HOW scores in the HOW’s column multiplied by the 
HOW’s weight. 
Optimally, the intrinsic weighting factors are based on some market or engineering parameter that is inherently 
quantified, but the methodology allows the possibility of qualitative 
assessments that are quantified to allow arithmetic manipulation. That 
was done in this study and will be described in detail below. The 
scoring selected for this study was small integer values in the range of 
0 or 1 to 4 or 5.  
One power of the QFD methodology comes from its ability to 
handle a sequence of assessments. Once the approaches (HOWs) have 
been enumerated and quantified, they can become the objectives 
(WHATs) in a subsequent assessment, with the score from one iteration 
becoming the intrinsic weighting of the next iteration (Figure 2). 
With multiple iterations, the multiplicative nature of the scoring 
causes some very large numbers. These are not in themselves 
Figure 1: QFD "House of Quality" 
Figure 2: Iterating on the House of Quality 
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Figure 3: Assessment of relevance of ISA technologies to NASA missions. 
 
particularly informative, but they create a helpful dispersion of the results. The multiplication also helps to thin out 
the space for consideration: any WHAT or HOW that receives a zero intrinsic weight is inherently eliminated from 
further consideration. 
III. The Assessment 
The present study used two iterations on the House of Quality, as illustrated in Figure 3. In the first iteration, the 
team surveyed NASA missions that could benefit from in-space assembly, compiled a list of the capabilities needed 
for ISA, and assessed the relevance of each 
capability to each mission. In the second 
iteration, we then compiled a list of the specific 
technologies that could provide the various 
capabilities and assessed the relevance of each 
technology to each capability. Relevance was 
assessed as either “enabling”, “supporting”, or 
irrelevant (unscored). Definitions and scoring 
of these assessments are shown in Table 1.  The 
result quantified the relevance of each ISA 
technology to all the idenitified missions. 
 
Assessment Definition Score 
Enabling This WHAT cannot be achieved without this HOW. 2 
Supporting This WHAT can be achieved without this HOW, but it is easier to achieve the WHAT with the HOW. 1 
Table 1: Relevance definitions and scoring. 
A. Mission - Capability Needs Assessment 
Before the missions were enumerated, the team identified two independent, intrinsic weighting criteria:  
 Realism / Probability.  Certain future missions seem more likely to be eventually 
fielded based on their importance to NASA, their costs, and their technical 
feasibility. A Realism / Probability criteria was defined and scores established 
per Table 2. Missions considered highly unlikely were not included in the 
assessment. No definitions were articulated for these ratings since there are no 
objective, quantified probabilities available.5 
 Mission Timing.  The timing of the future mission was also considered 
important. Missions that were expected to freeze their design concept in the 
nearer term were considered less likely to take advantage of the technologies, 
since the technologies are unlikely to be available when needed, but they were 
considered to have some mission-pull benefits nonetheless. Missions that were unlikely to be fielded before 
some indefinite future were also considered less intrinsically important for guiding investment decisions, 
independent of their ultimate probability of being fielded. Thus there is a “sweet spot” in the mid- to long-
term that is most likely to drive technology investment priority. Table 3 describes the criteria and scoring. 
All assessments are relative to the study timeframe, mid 2015. 
 
Assessment Definition Score 
ASAP mission selection has already occurred OR system concept development is in progress OR 
mission decision is imminent 
2 
near term 1 to 5 years in the future 3 
mid term 5 to 15 years in the future 4 
far term more than 15 years in the future 3 
indefinite future timeframe is hard to pin down, but it's decades in the future 1 
Table 3: Mission System Timing 
                                                          
5 In the absence of an objective, quantified metric, subjective assessments were made and the quantization needed for arithmetic 
manipulation was applied afterwards. 
Mission Systems Realism / 
Probability 
high 5 
medium-high 4 
medium 3 
medium-low 2 
low 1 
Table 2: Scoring mission 
realism / probability 
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The mission list and understanding of the needs of the mission systems was based on discussions with subject matter 
experts; the details are described in the literature3. The missions and their scoring are listed in Table 4.  
Mission Systems Realism / Probability Timing 
Combined 
weighting 
Exploration Augmentation Module high mid term 20 
High-definition visible space telescope low indefinite future 1 
Planet finder occulter medium mid term 12 
Artificial gravity habitation system medium far term 9 
In situ resource utilization station (surface) high far term 15 
Solar electric propulsion high near term 15 
Sun shade medium-high mid term 16 
Space dock medium far term 9 
Repurposed solar array at Mars medium mid term 12 
Commercial space station medium-high near term 12 
Long focal length x-ray telescope medium far term 9 
Far IR observatory medium indefinite future 3 
Life-finder medium far term 9 
Table 4: Mission drivers and scoring of their intrinsic importance for technology investments 
Against the Mission WHATs are deployed the Capability Need HOWs. A “capability need” is understood as 
some function that is foreseen as relevant to in-space assembly without consideration for exactly how that 
function is provided. For example, primary structural members can be secured together by either mechanical 
connection or welding, so “joining” in some form is captured as a needed capability.  
Two intrinsic criteria were identified for these capabilities.  They were explicitly assessed for their use in 
space, including remote operation. 
 Technical maturity. Because this assessment seeks to guide NASA investment priorities, capabilities that 
are already mature were rated lower than capabilities that had achieved an intermediate of maturity. 
Similarly, capabilities that have not established their feasibility are also rated lower. The criteria and their 
scoring are provided in Table 5. 
 
Assessment Definition Score 
conceptual Approaches to providing this capability are still conceptual. 0 
experimental This capability appears feasible, but applicability questions remain. 3 
prototyped This capability has been demonstrated in a prototype system. 4 
demonstrated This capability has been demonstrated by realistic hardware in a realistic scenario. 1 
operational This capability is already operational. 0 
Table 5: Maturity considerations for capability needs 
 Availablity without new investment by NASA. Capabilities that are already in development for commercial 
or Air Force use, for example, are rated lower than capabilities that are more dependent on the type of 
NASA development activity this study seeks to prioritize.   The criteria and their scoring are provided in 
Table 6. 
 
Assessment Definition Score 
not available Current program baselines do not make this capability available in the future. 4 
questionable Based on current plans and expectations, it's not clear that this capability will be available in the 
future. 
3 
limited This capability should be available in the future, but its abilities may be restricted. 2 
assured The capability will unquestionably be available in the future. 0 
Table 6: Capability availability without NASA investment 
 As before, the list of capabilities was generated by discussions with subject matter experts and the details are not 
presented here. The capabilities and their scoring are listed in Table 7. 
 The next step in the methodology outlined in Section II is to assess the relevance of each capability need to each 
mission using the relevance criteria in Table 1. The format of this paper does not permit display of this assessment. 
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Its result, the fully weighted and scored capabilities (HOWs) is presented in Table 8. For ease of interpretation, these 
results have been normalized to percentile and arranged in percentile order from largest to smallest. 
Capability Maturity Availability 
Combined 
weighting 
Soft docking / berthing of modules operational assured 0 
Deployable subsystems demonstrated assured 0 
Robotic assembly with joining experimental not available 12 
Long-reach manipulation demonstrated limited 2 
Modular design demonstrated limited 2 
Ability to assemble low mass structures experimental not available 12 
Ability to assemble high strength structures experimental not available 12 
Ability to assemble high stiffness structures experimental not available 12 
Ability to assemble structures with micro-stable joints experimental not available 12 
Ability to assemble structures with high dimensional stability prototyped not available 16 
Ability to assemble structures with near isothermal control prototyped not available 16 
Ability to route power and data across assembled joints experimental questionable 9 
Surface assembly of structures conceptual not available 0 
Additive manufacturing / welding experimental limited 6 
Ability to deploy pressure vessels prototyped questionable 12 
Membrane deployment operational assured 0 
Extrusion conceptual not available 0 
Table 7: Capabilities and scoring for their intrinsic maturity and availability 
A few unexpected results emerge from 
this assessment. In particular, the ability to 
route power and data around constructed 
joints is almost as essential as constructing 
the joints. Technology to date has provided 
several approaches to mechanical joining 
but neglected other modes of connectivity. 
Presumably these could be added with 
harnesses after the structural assembly, but 
no technology base has emerged to 
accomplish this robotically. This seems to 
be a gap.  
The assessment also makes clear that 
high stiffness is important, but high strength 
is not particularly important. On reflection, 
this is understandable because most of a 
conventional spacecraft’s structural strength 
is need to bear launch loads, which 
structures assembled in space will not 
experience. However several important 
applications, especially in astronomical 
systems, do require high stability in the 
structure’s geometry. 
B. Capability Needs – Technology Assessment 
The second iteration of the House of Quality converts these previous approaches, the capability need HOWs, into 
the objective WHATs, and considers the specific technology as the approaches (HOWs) to accomplishing those 
objectives. The numerical scores from the first iteration are carried forward as the intrinsic weightings of the 
objectives in this second iteration. 
Two intrinsic characteristics of these technologies were considered relevant to this assessment.  
In-Space Assembly Capability Percentile 
Robotic assembly with joining 100 
Ability to route power and data across assembled joints 97 
Ability to assemble high stiffness structures 73 
Ability to assemble low mass structures 71 
Ability to deploy pressure vessels 63 
Ability to assemble structures with high dimensional stability 58 
Ability to assemble high strength structures 38 
Ability to assemble structures with near isothermal control 36 
Additive manufacturing / welding 32 
Ability to assemble structures with micro-stable joints 25 
Modular design 22 
Long-reach manipulation 18 
Soft docking / berthing of modules 0 
Deployable subsystems 0 
Surface assembly of structures 0 
Membrane deployment 0 
Extrusion 0 
Robotic assembly with joining 0 
Table 8: Relative importance of ISA capabilities needed to support high 
priority NASA missions 
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 Technology readiness for application in space. Presumably low-TRL technology has yet to demonstrate its 
feasibility, and high-TRL is more appropriate and available for mission-pull funding. Table 9 shows the 
scoring for this factor. Although it has a lot in common with the “maturity” 
assessment against the capability needs, it speaks to the specific technology 
components of a capability and can be assessed against the more rigorous 
established criteria for TRL. 
 Whether the technology is likely to be commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), and if so, 
how much investment would be required to convert it to use in space. Although 
robotic assembly technology is quite mature for ground operations, for example 
automobile assembly, these systems generally cannot be used “as is” in space 
applications. Scoring reflects the assumption that adapting existing COTS technology produces better use of 
NASA’s investment than developing something specific for this purpose. Again there is a “sweet spot” 
reflecting the idea that if the technology can be adapted directly, it may be higher priority than something 
that requires dedicated investment.  The COTS criteria and their scoring are provided in Table 10. 
 
Assessment Definition Score 
none no commercial technology is directly relevant to this ISA technology 1 
little existing commercial technology would require major modifications to be useful 2 
some existing commercial technology would require significant modifications to be useful 3 
good COTS technology would require some minor, low risk modifications 4 
direct COTS technology can be used with little or no modification 3 
Table 10: COTS availability of technology 
Discussions with subject matter experts generated a brain-storming list fifty-one component technologies. This 
list was considered unwieldy. It 
was culled down by subjective 
considerations of what 
technologies were likely to be 
essential, important, nice to have, 
and optional for first-generation 
in-space assembly. An additional 
category called “cool” was added 
to capture unique technologies 
that seemed to have some 
interesting potential. It included 
things like fully-autonomous 
robotic assembly and electron-
beam welding. Nice-to-have 
technologies included such 
things as deployment of hinged 
and telescoping members and in 
situ measurement of joint 
stiffness. The optional category 
included such things as brazing, 
bolting, and extrusion. An 
advanced toolset of the indefinite 
future would likely contain all 
the technologies, but for this 
study, only those thirty 
considered essential, important, 
and “cool” were carried forward 
into the analysis. The 
assessments are shown in Table 
11. 
As before, the relevance of 
each technology to each 
TRL for space Score 
<TRL-3 0 
TRL-3, -4 2 
TRL-5 to -7  4 
>TRL-7 1 
Table 9: Scoring TRL 
for space 
ISA technology TRL 
COTS 
availability 
Combined 
weighting 
robotic assembly using supervised autonomy TRL-5 to -7 good 16 
registration and alignment of components TRL-5 to -7 good 16 
open loop metrology >TRL-7 direct 3 
structurally embedded utilities interfaces TRL-5 to -7 some 12 
incorporation of harness-based utilities TRL-5 to -7 good 16 
fluid cooling interfaces >TRL-7 good 4 
joining by snap-together interfaces TRL-5 to -7 little 8 
joining by combination action TRL-5 to -7 little 8 
adhesive joining / release TRL-3, -4 good 8 
vision metrology using fiducial aids >TRL-7 direct 3 
photogrammetry TRL-5 to -7 direct 12 
proof of joint load capability TRL-5 to -7 good 16 
measurement of structural stiffness TRL-5 to -7 good 16 
measurement of geometric precision TRL-3, -4 good 8 
joint nondestructive evaluation TRL-3, -4 some 6 
buildup from complex stock TRL-5 to -7 good 16 
deconstruction / repurposing TRL-3, -4 little 4 
passive thermal contact interfaces >TRL-7 direct 3 
robotic assembly with full autonomy <TRL-3 little 0 
e-beam welding >TRL-7 some 3 
joining by magnetic latching TRL-3, -4 some 6 
active interfaces within joints >TRL-7 direct 3 
buildup from simple stock TRL-5 to -7 good 16 
buildup from deployable units TRL-3, -4 some 6 
free-form fabrication with metals TRL-5 to -7 some 12 
free-form fabrication with composites TRL-3, -4 some 6 
motor-joint arm >TRL-7 direct 3 
tendon-joint arm TRL-5 to -7 little 8 
Table 11: Technologies and their scoring for TRL and COTS availability 
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capability need was assessed but is not shown. The final list of technologies, ranked in order and scored by 
percentile, is presented in Table 12. (Note: the table order preserves rank distinctions that emerge from the raw 
scores but are lost in the lower precision percentile scores.) 
IV. Discussion 
A space-qualified, simple (non-dexterous) grasp (ranked 1) for components emerges from this analysis as the 
single most high-leverage technology investment by a large margin. It is a ubiquitous, enabling need that is 
relatively mature and available commercially for easy adaptation to the space environment. In contrast, a dexterous 
grasp ranked poorly (20), suggesting that there is little need to add that complexity for early applications. Setting the 
simple grasp technology aside, the top third of the percentile range, that is, technologies scoring between the 64 th 
and 43rd percentile, encompasses a logical set needed to accomplish basic in-space assembly.  
The need to incorporate utilities, which emerged as a priority in the first iteration of the House of Quality, is 
reflected in its priority on this list. Harness-based utilities (2) traded better than structurally embedded utilities (6) 
because they were assessed as higher TRL and more readily adaptable from COTS sources. This analysis did not 
include considerations of launch or system mass, which might eventually weigh in favor of embedded utilities, but 
for a “starter set” of in-space assembly technologies, harness-based utilities seem preferable for their simplicity and 
adaptability. 
Issues of component registration (e.g. jigging) (3) and supervised autonomy (4) are logically next. They are 
generic technologies that enable almost all activities associated with structural build-up and are in the “sweet spot” 
for TRL and/or COTS availability. Supervised autonomy6, which involves humans in the loop remotely but not 
performing real-time operation, traded better than full autonomy (30) because 
it is more ready, and because full autonomy is not strictly necessary.  Real 
time remote (ground) operation was not included in the trade space because 
studies have shown that the communication link delays needed for operation 
even in low earth orbit can introduce instabilities. 
Buildup from complex stock (5), where “complex stock” is understood as 
being made from multiple materials such as a graphite composite shaft 
attached to metallic ends, as shown in Figure 4, traded better than buildup 
from simple stock (8) such as tubes or bars that would require joining by an 
external agent like welding or bolting, and than more complicated mechanical 
joints (9, 10). Concepts for such complex stock have already been developed 
and proven in NASA Langley’s lab at the TRL-5 level. Its composite shaft 
brings stiffness, thermal stability, and low weight, and its metallic ends 
facilitate joining. Again, this analysis didn’t consider weight or cost. Buildup 
                                                          
6 Note that EVA astronaut assembly was not included in the trade-space. Although it has been demonstrated in space and may 
therefore be considered TRL-9, it was ruled out a priori as being too costly and dangerous for routine construction. 
Rank Technology Percentile Rank Technology Percentile 
1 simple grasp 100 16 joining by magnetic latching 13 
2 incorporation of harness-based utilities 64 17 open loop metrology 13 
3 registration and alignment of components 58 18 joint nondestructive evaluation 13 
4 robotic assembly using supervised autonomy 53 19 photogrammetry 12 
5 buildup from complex stock 48 20 dexterous grasp 12 
6 structurally embedded utilities interfaces 42 21 motor-joint arm 9 
7 proof of joint load capability 36 22 active interfaces within joints 9 
8 buildup from simple stock 33 23 e-beam welding 7 
9 joining by snap-together interfaces 27 24 free-form fabrication with metals 4 
10 joining by combination action 27 25 vision metrology using fiducial aids 3 
11 tendon-joint arm 25 26 fluid cooling interfaces 3 
12 measurement of structural stiffness 24 27 passive thermal contact interfaces 3 
13 measurement of geometric precision 24 28 free-form fabrication with composites 2 
14 buildup from deployable units 21 29 deconstruction / repurposing 1 
15 adhesive joining / release 16 30 robotic assembly with full autonomy 0 
Table 12: Relative importance of ISA technologies needed to support high priority NASA missions 
Figure 4: Joining with complex 
components 
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from simple stock may ultimately prove to be the most cost- and mass-effective, but the advantages of using and 
joining complex stock seems to be appropriate for this “starter set” of technologies. 
Technologies for in-line quality assurance (7, 12, 13, 18), though they received good intrinsic scores (see Table 
11), assessed lower primarily because missions that requires the higher precision, strength, and stiffness are longer-
term drivers. It was considered that off-line measurements coupled with generous design margins would be adequate 
for early generation uses. 
Technologies for thermal and/or fluid interfaces across joints (26, 27) assessed low because of their technical 
difficulties and their lack of drivers from near-term missions. 
After these preliminary results were generated, several parameters were adjusted to determine the sensitivity of 
the overall results to the underlying scoring. Although a few items shifted a little, in general, the ranking proved to 
be robust to these small changes, providing confidence that the details of the assumptions were not critical to the 
results. 
V. Future Investigations 
The original intent of the study was to configure a handful of different demonstration experiments and deploy 
them as the HOWs in a third iteration of the House of Quality against these technologies as WHATs in order to 
determine an optimal technology demonstration with rigorous traceability all the way back to mission needs. Six 
different demonstration ideas were generated but events outside the study caused this activity to be terminated 
before its conclusion. Although there are currently no plans to restart the exercise with a view towards defining such 
a demonstration, the results could easily be adapted to that need. 
It would also be interesting to include the mission needs of other potential users such as the national security 
space and the commercial communities to test how robust the technology priorities are to the mission set. In 
particular, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has expressed interest in advancing in-space 
construction technologies and may be interested in using the QFD tool to investigate which technologies provide 
high leverage for military needs. 
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